Executive Summary
International capital flows and cross-border financial integration remain omnipresent in the European political debate as countries struggle with low and divergent GDP growth, new European financial regulation and the anticipation of Brexit.
In such a shifting environment, this report first identifies some of the more recent patterns in the landscape of European gross cross-border investment followed by a closer look at banking and portfolio investments.
Key Findings and Main Conclusions
• Excluding the UK, Europe's share of global gross capital inflows fell only marginally relative to the pre-crisis period, whereas the UK never recovered its former share. Increased shares went mainly to European financial hubs-Ireland, Luxembourg, and the Netherlandswhere there appears to have been some consolidation of financial intermediation over this period, and to developing countries and Asian financial hubs. Core euro area countries remain the primary actors in cross-border investment both globally and within the region.
• External imbalances persist for Southern and worsen for Central and Eastern Europe.
• European banks' claims worldwide and on developed Europe have significantly diminished, but their claims on developing Eastern European countries remain stable.
Countries' external imbalances and banks' exposure to less-regulated markets emphasize the necessity of well-established financial oversight as well as of a harmonization of the national rules and legislation. These would help ensure the success of European financial integration in terms of more evenly distributed growth and improved financial stability.
While banks are still the main financial intermediaries in the euro area, their share of the euro area financial sector is declining in favor of asset management firms, especially investment funds. Simultaneously, financial hubs like Ireland and Luxembourg have strengthened their position as the region's main fund domiciles since the financial crisis, benefiting from the implementation of the improved rules for Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS) in mid-2011 and early 2014.
Introduction
Capital flows play a central role in today's interconnected global economy, particularly at a time of volatile financial markets and concerns about the global economic outlook. The potential benefits are well known, from risk diversification and increased returns to strengthening countries' rates of investment and economic growth. Europe has been a key player in cross-border investment. 2 The routinely high ranking of many European countries in the Milken Institute Global Opportunity Index reflects this dominant position. This year is no exception, with the UK, Ireland, Sweden and Norway in the top 10.
The strong European position in cross-border investment has often been linked to the European single market (European Union) and the resulting integration. The advent of the euro strengthened the financial aspect of this trend. This rapid integration, combined with the lack of adequate regulatory oversight, is often identified as one of the main causes of the 2010-2012 European sovereign debt crisis. It allowed countries to accumulate unsustainable external imbalances, especially within the euro area, leaving European banks overly exposed. The post-crisis European recovery, slow yet steady, shows the resilience of the region. However, significant economic differences across countries remain a concern.
The lack of synchronization among European economies, the current regulatory pressure and uncertainty as well as the prospect of Brexit post significant challenges.
2 Throughout this report, "Europe" generally refers to the EU-28 plus Norway and Switzerland.
In such a shifting environment, this report aims to identify some of the more recent patterns in the landscape of European cross-border investment, especially portfolio investment and banking. 3 First, it depicts the evolution of the size and composition of European gross flows and positions through time and geographic allocation. The analysis specifically investigates gross as opposed to net flows and positions because domestic and foreign investors may have different behavior. 4 Second, it focuses on portfolio investments and analyzes their recent change in distribution across countries and investment vehicles.
While our analysis is rich in empirical findings, four appear particularly interesting. First, core euro-area countries, including Luxembourg and the Netherlands, are the main actors in attracting investments and in making them. Meanwhile, external imbalances persist for Southern Europe and are worsening for Central and Eastern Europe. Second, European banks' cross-border exposure has significantly diminished, but has changed little regarding developing Europe. The countries' external imbalances and banks' exposure to these lessregulated markets emphasize the necessity of well-established financial oversight as well as harmonization of the national rules and legislation. These changes would help ensure 3 Foreign direct investment inflows mainly measure transactions that increase nonresidents' direct equity in domestic firms with controlling interest, commonly defined as a share of ownership of at least 10 percent, net of any divestment. Portfolio investment inflows consist of nonresidents' purchases from residents of equity and debt securities originally issued by residents, net of nonresidents' sales to residents of these securities. Banking inflows include capital flows not accounted for as FDI or portfolio investment. These consist mainly of loans (net of repayment) from nonresidents, primarily foreign banks; nonresidents' deposits in domestic banks; and domestic firms' trade credit and other accounts payable to nonresidents. 4 Gross flows and positions have grown substantially relative to net flows and positions in recent decades, and are now recognized as giving a more complete picture of where countries invest and what form that investment takes (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2001; Kraay et al. 2005) , returns on these investments (Gourinchas and Rey, 2007) , and how these international exposures play out during crises (Forbes and Warnock 2012; Janus and Riera-Crichton 2013; Broner et al. 2013) . the success of European financial integration by evenly distributing growth and improving financial stability.
The remaining two points focus on European portfolio investment and the growth of alternative lending. Banks' share of total assets in the euro area financial sector is declining in favor of asset management firms, especially investment funds; in addition, financial hubs such as Ireland and Luxembourg are becoming increasingly important. Financial hubs seem to be benefiting from the harmonized regime for cross-border investment throughout Europe. Finally, the report confirms that regional specificities in the financial sector remain strong, as illustrated by the level of diversity of investment funds in Europe-which is significantly higher than in the U.S.-and by substantial heterogeneity in European reliance on banking. This point cannot be ignored when designing a framework for European, or international, financial oversight.
The report proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the patterns of capital flows and positions for the world and Europe, while Section 3 focuses on the income generated by European investments. Moving away from countries' total external assets and liabilities, Section 4 provides bilateral information on countries' portfolio investment abroad. Section 5 investigates the European financial sector, more specifically the fastest growing category, investment funds, and its three main actors: money market, bond, and equity funds. Finally, Section 6 concludes, highlighting the relationship between the reports' main findings and the notions of financial integration, regulation, and stability.
Global and European Capital Flows
Global gross capital flows famously surged in the years leading up to the global financial crisis and then collapsed precipitously (see Figure 1) . At the center of the surge was Europe, which benefitted from the creation of the euro area-which eliminated exchange-rate risk for financial transactions in the region-and several other important dimensions of financial integration that had been progressing from as early as the 1980s. 5 These included reductions in capital controls, financial regulatory harmonization, and concomitant improvements in financial market depth and liquidity. 6 These effects spilled over to drive gross flows outside the euro area as well, especially in the case of the UK, which plays a unique role in intermediating European flows. Elsewhere, the spurring of gross flows was mainly limited to the U.S. and other advanced economies. 5 At the same time, the creation of the euro area introduced new challenges to adjusting to external imbalances particular to the context of a common currency and monetary policy; Lane (2013) provides an overview of these. 6 Lane (2008) and Lane (2013) provide overviews of the empirical evidence on the drivers of capital flows, both globally and specifically for Europe. 7 The East Asia and Pacific, and Latin America, Africa, Middle East, and South Asia groupings follow World Bank classifications. * 2015 country coverage was incomplete at the time of writing. However, countries missing in 2015 only accounted for 3.4% of total world inflows in 2014; these are concentrated in the Latin America, Africa, Middle East, and South Asia group. One striking feature of both series is that when they are measured in dollars, they show a sharp increase leading up to the global financial crisis, followed by a sharp decrease after it began.
When measured in euros, both series evolve much more smoothly. The underlying reason for this is that international investments are denominated in a mix of currencies, so converting them into any single currency for the purpose of aggregation and comparison makes these measures sensitive to changes in exchange rates.
The most recent comprehensive estimates of the currency composition of European countries' international investment positions suggest that, as of 2012, roughly 59 percent of their total external assets and 66 percent of their external liabilities were denominated in euros. 11 Compare these, respectively, to 18 percent and 10 percent for the dollar, and 8 percent and 11 percent for the pound. Hence, the euro seems a more appropriate unit of account than the dollar when focusing on European countries. [ There was also a reshuffling based on nationality, with bank groups based in Germany, the UK, [ 
European International Investment Positions and Investment Income
The preceding section illustrates the heterogeneity across European subregions and countries in the composition of foreign investment and of their investment abroad. These differences have implications on investment income paid and earned on these external liabilities and assets, and for risk sharing and vulnerability to shocks. While a set of core European countries 16 Capital flows are measured in terms of absolute value to capture the magnitude of negative flows, i.e., disinvestment, together with positive inflows; absolute values are taken of annual flows, and these values are averaged across the three years. * Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Portugal, and Romania had outstanding loans with the IMF during the sample period; the principle and servicing of IMF loans are included in the "banking" components of liabilities and inflows, respectively.
are net creditors and make positive net income on their IIPs, peripheral countries tend to be net borrowers and net payers of investment income (see Figure 4 ). 17 Core Europe
Southern Europe

Central & Eastern Europe
17 In principle, the sign of a country's net investment income does not necessarily correspond to the sign of its net external position. For the U.S., for example, Gourinchas and Rey (2007) show that while the country is a sizeable net debtor, its net investment income is positive due to an excess return on gross assets over gross liabilities. 18 Country groupings are the same as those in Figure 2 , subject to data limitations. For all groups except Central and Eastern Europe, investment income from official reserves accounts for an insignificant fraction of total investment income and thus is omitted from the figures. Europe's liabilities, differences in risk premia, and broad differences between the groups in their levels of economic and financial development.
Lower yields have spilled over to interest rates on loans and deposits, the main components of the banking category of IIPs and capital flows shown in Figures 2 and 3 above. While this category's share of external assets and liabilities is roughly the same for Core, Southern, and
Eastern and Central Europe, trends in the interest rates on these assets and liabilities have not been symmetric across groups. Interest income on these positions have fallen across Europe on both the assets and liabilities sides, but the spread between them has increased for the Core and South (in some cases switching from negative to positive, for example in Germany), whereas it has deteriorated and switched signs from positive to negative in Central and Eastern
Europe (see Figure 5 ). 
European Portfolio Investment Holdings
Moving from countries' total external assets and liabilities to bilateral information on which countries invest where, with a focus on the portfolio investment category, Figure 6 shows the different holdings of European countries on distinctive counterparties-Asia, euro area, rest of One difficulty with bilateral portfolio investment data is that they may not be allocated to the country of the ultimate acquirer of the claim.
Legend (Pie Chart)
Sources: IMF CPIS; MI-IFM calculations.
The European Financial Sector 22
To illustrate the shifting composition of the euro area financial sector, Figure 
Investment Funds
The growing importance of investment funds in non-bank intermediation has raised concerns about their possible role as a source and catalyst of systemic risk in times of financial distress. 24 However, investment funds are a broad and heterogeneous group, and the next sections provide a closer look at their distribution across Europe as well as across types of investments, especially money market, bond and equity funds. 25
Geography of Risk
The investment fund assets by domicile show that most funds within Europe are concentrated in four countries (see Figure 8 ). France and Germany, with a combined €3.2 ($3.5) trillion, are two of the major investment fund domiciles. Their share of 30 percent, however, is second only 24 Lopez et al. (2016) and ECB (2016) 25 Fund categories are not fixed and might change over time, which can lead to changes in the assets managed by certain categories due to reclassification of funds, e.g., a money market fund being classified as bond fund.
to Luxembourg and Ireland, which have a combined share of 51 percent, or €5.5 ($6) trillion, confirming their status as financial hubs. Sources: European Central Bank; MI-IFM calculations. Figure 9 shows the different fund types and their total assets for the euro area. Bond and equity funds are the main drivers of the sector's overall growth. 26 Growth within the funds arguably is driven by the impact of current monetary policy on both bond and equity prices (see Box 3). This effect is caused by accounting assets as mark-to-market, meaning that they are valued at their current market price or a fair-value assessment thereof. The three largest fund types are equity, bond, and money market funds, which account for more than 85 percent of total assets under management. 26 Mixed funds are hybrids of bond and equity funds and therefore are considered included in them. Central Banks typically control an overnight interest rate as their policy tool by adjusting the supply of reserves. The transmission of monetary policy happens through the relationship of this overnight rate to the rest of the yield curve. 28 This relationship is crucial since interest rates, such as the unsecured money market rates (Euribor in Europe), determine short-term bank loans and deposit rates that directly affect financing conditions for household and corporations.
It also directly impacts bond yields because government bond yields are falling (rising) during accommodative (restrictive) monetary policy. This is due to the fact that major central banks, such as the Federal Reserve, conduct their open market operations in government and agency securities. 29 In the case of an accommodative policy, this is followed by an increased search-foryield in the fixed income sector and rising demand for corporate bonds, thereby leading to higher prices of corporate bonds as yields decrease and corporations are able to issue bonds with lower coupons. Lower interest rates also impact equity prices, as investors, all else being equal, can discount future cash flows at the lower rates and therefore are willing to pay more for stocks. 30
Figure 9: Investment fund assets by category, euro area 27 Bernanke (2003) . 28 See, for example, Carpenter and Demiralp (2011) . 29 The ECB, lacking a direct fiscal counterpart, is conducting its main refinancing operations as weekly standard tenders. 30 For a more detailed discussion on the effect of monetary policy shocks see Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) .
Sources: European Central Bank; Thomson Reuters Datastream; MI-IFM calculations.
Money Market Funds
Money markets and their funds were the first to attract regulators' attention due to their close ties with the real economy through their credit intermediation activities. Figure 10 shows that money market funds (MMF) are concentrated in three countries -Ireland, Luxembourg, and
France -collectively holding around 96 percent of total MMF assets. In general, MMFs are separated into those that have a constant net asset value (CNAV) and variable net asset value (VNAV). Before the global financial crisis, most MMFs worldwide followed CNAV, under which an investment fund aims to maintain a stable share price, e.g., $1. Many investors prefer the stable share price because it has certain advantages, e.g., exemption from capital gains tax.
However, this perceived stability came under scrutiny during the financial crisis when many funds were unable to maintain the constant share price without sponsor support, culminating in the Reserve Primary Fund "breaking the buck," that is, lowered its share price below $1, accelerating a run on the sector. 31, 32 The run on MMFs was mitigated only through the combined support of the treasury, which guaranteed MMF assets, and two liquidity measures by the Federal Reserve. 33, 34 This turmoil of the money market fund sector, which generally was regarded as a low-risk investment similar to deposits, led to concerns about the impact of money market funds and investment funds on financial stability. Unlike in the U.S., Europe has a more diversified MMF sector that accommodates both CNAV and VNAC funds. Most VNAV funds are based in France while Ireland and Luxembourg are home to funds that mainly follow CNAV. This may partly explain the increase in assets in those countries, as investors sought the perceived safety of CNAV funds around recent uncertainty.
Another major driver of asset reallocation is the current, and expected, level of return for euro 31 This perceived stability has been one of the reasons that has led regulators to push CNAV funds to float their net asset value, thereby clarifying the underlying risk. 32 Sponsor support, generally, refers to a transfer of assets without a direct equivalent or purchase of fund assets at a premium. Luxembourg, which are more exposed to the higher rates on the dollar and pound money markets (see Figure 11) . Another important factor, as detailed in Box 2, is the unit of account.
As the euro depreciated, total assets of funds in Luxembourg and Ireland have reflected their exposure to other currencies. Note: Ireland includes total asset breakdown, whereas Luxembourg is limited to debt securities (75% of total assets).
Equity and Bond -A Continuum of Risk
Beyond MMFs, other asset management activities are increasingly considered potential sources of instability. 36 For investment funds, this has meant additional scrutiny, especially on the two biggest fund types, bond and equity.
Equity funds, which invest primarily in stocks, have become one of the largest fund types within the euro area (see Figure 9 ). Their total net assets grew from €974 billion ( European investment funds are classified as UCITS funds. In fact, UCITS has substantially decreased the difficulties of cross-border investments by creating a secure and well-regulated framework for the European Union. However, there are other national regulations and directives that can determine asset manager and investor decisions. At the national level, taxation is a major factor in domicile selection, as is the existing financial infrastructure and available services. Therefore, while direct regulation is uniform, the aforementioned differences have led to a concentration of funds (see Figures 12 and 13) . 37 The picture is the same for equity and bond funds, more than 50 percent of which, in terms of asset value, are managed in Luxembourg and Ireland. Figure 15 . Total assets of European equity funds are less than one-third of the U.S.
funds' $7.6 trillion (€6.9 trillion). Again, the diversity of European funds is not only greater in terms of the number of categories but also asset concentration. 41 The three biggest European equity funds combined only hold about 28 percent of total fund assets, compared to more than 50 percent for the U.S. The biggest U.S. category in size, "large blend," defined as "portfolios
[that] are fairly representative of the overall U.S. stock market in size, growth rates and price," manages almost as much assets ($1.9 trillion or €1.7 trillion) as the entire European equity fund sector. 42 Figure 14 : Breakdown of Bond Funds in Europe and the U.S. 43 38 The coverage for equity funds is almost seamless, but bond funds data by Morningstar only covers 73% of the bond fund's AUM. 39 See Novick et al. (2016) for more detail on the U.S. sector. 40 Morningstar (2015) . 41 This is in parts due to different currencies and their hedges as part of category separation. 42 Morningstar (2016) . 43 For ease of comparison both European and U.S. fund assets are shown in dollar. 
Conclusion
International capital flows and cross-border financial integration remain omnipresent in the European political debate as countries struggle with low and divergent GDP growth, new
European financial regulation, and the anticipation of Brexit.
This report provides insights regarding international capital flows and positions before focusing on the banking and portfolio investment categories. Third, a closer look at portfolio investment, especially for the fast-growing investment funds, confirms the strengthened position of financial hubs like Ireland and Luxembourg as fund domiciles since the financial crisis. Interestingly, the implementation of the improved rules for UCITS in mid-2011 and early 2014 corresponds to an enhanced growth for equity and bond funds' total assets, mostly in these two countries. Finally, European investment funds show a diverse range in investment types and strategies, especially when compared to the U.S. This is particularly relevant for bond funds. European bond funds' total assets amount to about 70 percent of the U.S. total, while their diversity in terms of number of subcategories is more than double that of the U.S. Unlike for the U.S., no category captures a significant part of the total for Europe.
The external imbalances for Southern, Central, and Eastern Europe remain a concern, especially in light of the recent European sovereign debt crisis, which followed the global financial crisis.
Back then, in 2010, Southern European countries' external imbalances resulted from the greater financial integration that came with the single currency. The surge in credit and intraregional capital flows, combined with overly optimistic expectations, mispricing of risk, and insufficient oversight led to the gradual increase in national current account deficits. These led to the "large external debts in the Eurozone periphery, matched by growing claims held notably financial integration without a certain degree of harmonization across Europe may undermine the potential overall benefits of cross-border investments within the region.
